This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed a general model for cooperative games defined on lattice structures. In this paper, the restrictions to the cooperation are given by a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which generalizes antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the core and the Weber set of games on augmenting systems are introduced and it is proved that monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we obtain a characterization of the convexity of these games in terms of the core of the game and the Weber set of the extended game.
Introduction
Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are cooperative games in which the players have restricted communication possibilities, which are defined by a combinatorial structure. The first model in which the restrictions are defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph is introduced by Myerson [10] . Since then, many other situations where players have communication restrictions have been studied in cooperative game theory. Contributions on graph-restricted games include Owen [11] , Borm, Owen, and Tijs [4] and Hamiache [8] . In these models the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a communication graph. Another type of combinatorial structure introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [7] and van den Brink [5] is equivalent to a subclass of antimatroids. This line of research focuses on the possibilities of coalition formation determined by the positions of the players in the so-called permission structure. Faigle [6] adopts a different point of view. He considers a non-empty collection of feasible coalitions and a game defined on this collection and extends this game.
In the present paper, we use a restricted cooperation model derived from a combinatorial structure called augmenting system, introduced by Bilbao [3] . In Section 2, we recall preliminaries on this combinatorial structure which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. The aim of Section 3 is the introduction of the non-negative core and the Weber set for a game on an augmenting system. In the classical situation, for every cooperative game v : 2 N → R with v (∅) = 0, the core of v is contained in the Weber set. Moreover, v is convex if and only if the Weber set coincides with the core of v. For a game v : F → R + , where F ⊂ 2 N is an augmenting system, the inclusion Core + (N, v, F ) ⊆ Weber (N, v, F ) is not true. However, in Section 4 we show that for monotone convex games on augmenting system, the Weber set is contained in the non-negative core which is non-empty. In the last section, we show that the superadditivity and a new concept of convexity are hereditary properties with respect to the extended game N, v F . Furthermore, we obtain the following characterization: A monotone game (N, v, F ) is convex if and only if
Augmenting systems
This section is based on Bilbao [3] . It basically recalls preliminaries on augmenting systems and some concepts and results that will be used in the following. Let N be a finite set. A set system over N is a pair (N, F ) where F ⊆ 2 N is a family of subsets. The sets belonging to F are called feasible. We will write S ∪ i and S \ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S \ {i} respectively and we will use the symbols ⊂ and ⊆ to denote strict inclusion and inclusion. We will recall the concept of augmenting system.
Definition 1.
An augmenting system is a set system (N, F ) with the following properties:
Example. The following collections of subsets of N = {1, . . . , n}, given by F = 2 N , F = {∅, {i}} where i ∈ N, and F = {∅, {1}, . . . , {n}}, are augmenting systems over N.
Example. Let us consider a communication graph
where N is the set of players and E is the set of edges which represents the bilateral communication between some players. Given a coalition S ⊆ N, the set of edges between players in S is denoted by E(S) = {ij ∈ E : i, j ∈ S}. Thus, the set system (N, F ) given by
is an augmenting system. Example. Gilles et al. [7] showed that the feasible coalition system (N, F ) derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the empty set, the ground set N, and that it is closed under union. Algaba et al. [1] showed that the coalition systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunctive approach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with the path property, respectively. The relationship between antimatroids and augmenting systems given by Bilbao [3] implies that these coalition systems are augmenting systems.
The next property is proved by Algaba, Bilbao, and Slikker [2] . Example. The set system given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
is an augmenting system. Since {1, 4} ∈ F the system (N, F ) is not an antimatroid. Moreover, {1, 2} ∩ {2, 4} = {2} ∈ F and hence (N, F ) is not a convex geometry.
Let (N, F ) be a set system and let S ⊆ N be a subset. The maximal non-empty feasible subsets of S are called components of S. We denote by C F (S) the set of the components of a subset S ⊆ N. Observe that the set C F (S) may be the empty set.
This set will play a role in the extension of a game restricted by an augmenting system. 
Note that the family of components C F (S) forms a partition of a subset of S, and v F (S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F . Now, we define the non-negative core of the game (N, v, F ) and the core of (N, v F ).
where we denote x(S) = i∈S x i , and x(∅) = 0.
Proposition 5.
The non-negative core of the game (N, v, F ) coincides with the core of its extension (N, v F ).
Proposition 6. The non-negative core of the game (N, v, F ) is a polyhedron contained in the convex cone R
Proof. Since Core
is given by a finite set of inequalities and
, we obtain the property.
Let us consider a standard cooperative game v : 2 N → R with v(∅) = 0, and a total ordering of the elements of N, given by i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i n . Then we obtain the following chain of coalitions
The marginal worth vector a C ∈ R n with respect to the above total ordering in the game (N, v) is given by a
The Weber set of the game (N, v) is the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors, i.e., Weber(N, v) = conv{a C : C is a total ordering of N}. It is easy to show that
In our model, we can consider the compatible orderings of an augmenting system (N, F ) with N ∈ F , as the total orderings of N, i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i n such that the set i 1 , . . . , i j ∈ F for all j = 1, . . . , n. A compatible ordering of (N, F ) corresponds exactly to a chain of length n in F and we denote by Ch(F ) the set of all the chains of length n of F .
Definition 7.
The Weber set of a game (N, v, F ) is given by
The next property follows from the definition of a C .
Weber [13] showed that any game v :
. This property may not hold for a game v :
Example. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let F = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, N}. We define the game v :
There are three chains of length n in F given by
The marginal worth vectors are
and hence we obtain
Then we have that
Monotone convex games
A cooperative game (N, υ, F ) is monotone if for all S, T ∈ F with S ⊆ T , we have v(S) ≤ v(T ). In general, the extension N, v F of a monotone game (N, v, F ) is not necessarily monotone as the next example shows.
Example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and we consider the augmenting system
The game v : F → R + defined by v(S) = 1 for every non-empty S ∈ F , and v(∅) = 0 is monotone. The extension v
Shapley [12] introduces the notion of convexity for cooperative games v : Let us consider a game v : F → R + , where F ⊆ 2 N . In this restricted game, the above convexity inequalities could be applied to feasible coalitions S, T ∈ F such that S ∩ T ∈ F and S ∪ T ∈ F . However, they are not sufficient to ensure that the extended game v
Example. Let F = {∅, {1} , {2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3} , {1, 2, 3}} be an augmenting system and the restricted game v :
This restricted game v is monotone and satisfies the convexity inequalities, but its extended game v F is not convex because
Then we introduce the following concept of convexity for restricted games.
Definition 9.
A cooperative game (N, v, F ) is said to be convex if for all S, T ∈ F with S ∪ T ∈ F , we have
Note that if F = 2 N then the above inequality is the classical convexity. Proof. Since ∅, N ∈ F , property (P3) of the augmenting systems implies the existence of a chain of length n of feasible
. . , i j } ∈ F for all j = 1, . . . , n. We define the corresponding marginal worth vector x ∈ R N + as follows:
Note that
for all j = 1, . . . , n and x(N) = v(N). Since v is monotone we obtain x i j ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. We will show that x(S) ≥ v(S) for any S ∈ F . For this, we consider S ∈ F such that S = C j for all j = 1, . . . , n and suppose that S is a minimal, with respect to the inclusion, feasible coalition such that x(S) < v(S).
Since ∅ ⊂ C 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ C n−1 ⊂ C n = N is a chain of length n, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that S ⊂ C j and S ⊆ C j−1 . Then i j ∈ S and hence S ∪ C j−1 = C j ∈ F . By applying the convexity of v to the feasible coalitions S and C j−1 we obtain
Note that S is minimal feasible coalition such that x(S) < v(S) and for each
By using x(C j−1 ) = v(C j−1 ) we conclude that x(S) ≥ v(S), which is a contradiction. 
Moreover, any marginal worth vector is a vertex of Core
Proof. For all C ∈ Ch(F ) the marginal worth vector a C belongs to the convex set Core
for all feasible coalition belonging to chain C of length n. Then we obtain n equations which are linearly independent and therefore its solution a C is a vertex of the polytope Core
We observe that every convex game is superadditive. Proof. Let S, T ∈ F with S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T ∈ F . Then there exists a chain C which contains S ∪ T and we take
Hereditary properties of (N, v, F )
In this section, we show that the superadditivity and the convexity of a monotone game (N, v, F ) imply the corresponding property of the extended game N, v 
Proof. Suppose that N, v
F is not superadditive. Then there exist coalitions S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ and components
and that n is minimal among those choices of coalitions for which the inequality holds.
If n ≥ 2 we consider the coalitions S \ S n and S n . Note that |C F (S n )| = 1 and |C F (S \ S n )| = n − 1, since otherwise S n is not a maximal feasible subset of S. Then we have
Thus, we obtain
which is a contradiction. Hence we conclude that n = 1.
and we assume that m is as small as possible among all such counterexamples. We next consider the following three cases.
and this gives a contradiction.
(
Since S 1 ⊂ C * and S 1 is a maximal feasible subset of S there exists a chain of feasible coalitions
By using the superadditivity of v, we have
and this contradiction completes the proof of the superadditivity of v F .
Finally, we will show that v F is monotone. Let S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T . Since v F is superadditive and v
Remark 15. We present in the Appendix an alternative proof of Theorem 14 proposed by an anonymous reviewer. 
and that n is minimal among all pairs of coalitions satisfying the above inequality.
Suppose that n ≥ 2 and let S \ S n and S n , where
We note that
The superadditivity of v
and this contradicts the hypothesis that n ≥ 2. We thus have C F (S) = {S 1 } and we assume that m is as small as possible. There are two possible cases:
F is superadditive and monotone, we obtain
which is a contradiction.
(ii) There exists at least p ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that S 1 ∩ T p = ∅. Since S 1 ∩ T p = ∅, property (P2) implies that S 1 ∪ T p ∈ F and applying the convexity of v,
By using the monotonicity of v F , we obtain
From the superadditivity of v F , we deduce that
and this contradiction completes the proof. 
and we obtain the result.
By using Proposition 5 and the classical characterization of convex games, we obtain the following characterization of the convexity for games on augmenting systems. and hence v (S 1 ) > v (S 1 ∪ i). Applying monotonicity we arrive at a contradiction, and we therefore conclude that i ∈ S , i.e., there exists an index r = 1 with i ∈ S r . Let S denote (S 1 ∪ i) ∪ S r = S 1 ∪ S r , which is feasible according to property (P2). Again, due to the choice of S and S 1 , . . . , S k we must have
Therefore, v (S 1 ∪ S r ) = v S < v (S 1 ) + v (S r ) and this contradicts the superadditivity of (N, v, F ) . We conclude that (N, v, F ) is proper.
Next, we will show that the extended game N, v F is superadditive. Let S, T ⊆ N be disjoint coalitions. Let S 1 , . . . , S s ∈ F , T 1 , . . . , T t ∈ F , and U 1 , . . . , U m ∈ F denote the components of S, T , and S ∪ T . Observe that S k ⊆ U j or S k ∩ U j = ∅ for each combination of components S k and U j since otherwise (P2) implies U j ⊂ S k ∪ U j ∈ F contradicting the maximality of U j in S ∪ T . The same holds for the components of T and U.
Since the restricted game (N, v, F ) is proper and the components of S and T are pairwise disjoint, we have for each j = 1, . . . , m,
For each index k = 1, . . . , s we have S k ⊆ U q for exactly one index q ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and this holds also for the components of T . Therefore, we have 
T ).
This shows the superadditivity of N, v F .
